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The “dissolving margins” of Elena Ferrante and the Neapolitan Novels 
A Cognitive Approach to Fictionality, Authorial Intentionality, and Autofictional Reading 
Strategies 
Alison Gibbons, Sheffield Hallam University 
 
Using Elena Ferrante’s Neapolitan novels as case study, this article presents a 
cognitive approach to fictionality and authorial intention using Text World Theory 
and Mind-Modelling. It investigates two forms of ontological distortion: readers’ 
(mis)classification of the novels’ genre (as autofiction or autobiography) and the 
problem posed by the author’s pseudonymic identity. The analysis has three parts: 
first, I conduct a Text World analysis of the novels’ syntactic/stylistic similarities to 
autobiography and, in doing so, reveal its ontological structure; second, I consider the 
ontological liminality of narration and the ways in which readers build an authorial 
mind-model of Ferrante; thirdly, I explore the assessment of critics and/as readers of 
the text’s fictionality and the impact of Ferrante’s pseudonym on perceptions of 
authorial intentionality and the authorial mind-model. Ultimately, I argue that a 
cognitive approach offers greatest insight into readers’ interpretations of authors and 
of fictionality. 
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Introduction 
 
In Elena Ferrante's My Brilliant Friend, the first novel in the Neapolitan Quartet, the narrator 
describes what her friend Lila reportedly calls a sensation of “dissolving margins” in which 
“the outlines of people and things suddenly dissolved, disappeared” (Ferrante 2012, p. 89).1 
For Lila, such episodes are experienced as psychic disturbances, yet the concept might 
equally designate the blur or indeterminacy of fictionality that characterizes the reception of, 
publicity for, and reporting on both the author Elena Ferrante and her Neapolitan novels. 
Briggs (2015), for instance, writes about her experience of reading the Neapolitan novels: 
“The usual distance between fiction and life collapses when you read Ferrante” (no 
pagination). In this article, I investigate two forms of ontological distortion: the 
(mis)classification of the novels’ genre by readers and the problem posed by the author’s 
pseudonymic identity. I explore the dissolving margins between fictionality and referentiality 
in reception or, in other words, how readers identify, navigate, and even confuse or reject the 
intended fictionality or referentiality of a work – intended, that is, by authors and/or 
publishers and marked as such through, for instance, textual features, paratextual framing, or 
extratextual signals. Against the grain of most narrative inquiries into fictionality, I adopt a 
cognitive approach, arguing that such an approach offers the greatest insight into how readers 
form their interpretative judgments and experience fictional texts and their authors as 
vicariously real. 
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Narrative Inquiry and Fictionality 
 
In contemporary narrative theory, there exist three predominant approaches to fictionality: 
semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic/rhetorical (Gorman, 2005; Schaeffer, 2012; Zetterberg 
Gjerlevsen, 2016). Herein, I provide an overview of these approaches, critically evaluating 
each. In doing so, I demonstrate that there is as yet no comprehensive account of fictionality 
that adequately captures the experience of readers. 
Semantic approaches primarily ground the fact-fiction distinction in the ontological 
status of subject matter (e.g., assessing the truthfulness of propositions). Such accounts are 
underwritten by analytic philosophy and modal logic and often associated with Possible 
Worlds Theory (cf. Pavel, 1986; Ryan, 1991; Ronen, 1994; Doležel, 1998). The value of 
semantic and Possible Worlds approaches lies in their recognition of different narrative 
ontologies as well as in the decoupling of fictionality as concept from a narrow understanding 
of fiction as literary work (Zetterberg Gjerlevsen, 2016). Semantic approaches thus allow a 
broader sense of fictionality as invention and imagination. The approach, however, also 
entails shortcomings. Schaeffer (2012) suggests that texts with hybrid ontologies, such as 
counterfactual fiction and autofiction, pose challenges because the semantic account is too 
“segregationist” (Pavel, 1986, pp. 11–17; cited in Schaeffer, 2012). Werth (1999), in fact, 
makes a similar point, when he writes, “it is assumed to be possible to distinguish between 
propositions and non propositions, i.e. to decide which expressions are capable of bearing a 
truth-value and what that truth value might be” (p. 196). The problem with such an 
assumption, according to Werth (1999), is that it is founded on the belief that “reference is a 
straightforward matter of being able to designate the extension of a constant ‘in the world’” 
(1996, p. 196). In both semantic and Possible Worlds thinking, the question of referential or 
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fictional positioning is thus shifted into the symbolic domain; as Walsh (2007) criticizes, this 
“allows the language of fiction to be literal contingently, on the basis of what it is possible to 
infer from the text” (p. 15). More significantly, because of this shift, semantic approaches fall 
short in capturing the experientiality of what seems fictional or real for readers (Schaeffer, 
2012). Indeed, in his outline of frameworks that might account for the cognitive processes of 
reading, Stockwell (2002) finds Possible Worlds Theory not fit for purpose precisely because 
it “is a formal logic set, not a cognitive array of knowledge. This means that possible worlds 
theory has little to say about the worlds of literary reading” (p. 93).2  
The syntactic approach has been called “text-focused” (Klauk & Köppe, 2014; 
Fludernik, 2018, p. 71) because of the attention paid to textual features as indicators of 
fictionality (cf. Hamburger, 1973; Banfield, 1982; Cohn, 1999). Although some critics insist 
that such features are “the differentia specifica of narrative fiction” – as Banfield (1983, p. 
258; original emphasis) claims for the representation of consciousness – others instead note 
that they are characteristic and only “optional” (Genette, 1993, p. 83). Syntactic approaches 
are appealing because they enable analysts to identify elements that might signal to readers 
how texts should be interpreted. Conversely, these signals have been widely critiqued for 
their unreliability. As Nielsen, Phelan, and Walsh (2016) write, “[n]o technique is found in all 
fiction and/or only in fiction, even though within certain cultural and historical contexts 
certain textual features can become strong conventional indices of fictive communicative 
intent” (p. 66; original emphasis). Narratologists have sought to negotiate the unreliability of 
signposts by reconceiving of them as “narrative techniques associated with fictionality” 
(Hatavara & Mildorf, 2017, p. 67) or fictionalizing strategies embedded at a local level within 
texts categorized as non-fiction overall (Iversen & Nielsen, 2016; Phelan, 2016). From a 
cognitive perspective, any rigid equation of textual signposts with fiction is too essentialist 
because: firstly, not all texts can be clearly defined as either fact or fiction; and secondly, to 
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equate text features so absolutely neglects the possibility that authors might deliberately 
mislead readers and that readers might misinterpret or ignore such signposts. 
Finally, the pragmatic or rhetorical approach bases its treatment of fictionality within a 
communication model originally designed for oral communication (cf. Searle, 1975; Walsh, 
2007; Nielsen et al., 2015; Phelan, 2017). In this view, “there is no necessary homology of 
form and function, and techniques follow from communicative purposes, not the other way 
around” (Nielsen et al., 2015, pp. 66–67). That is, textual features are produced by 
speakers/writers for hearers/readers to recognize. Fictionality is consequently a “contextual 
assumption” (Walsh, 2007, p. 30) of authorial intentionality. As Phelan (2017) explains, 
“someone intentionally signaling distinguishes fictionality from lying […]. Unlike liars, users 
of fictionality want their audiences to recognize their departures from the realm of the actual” 
(p. 235; original emphasis). The focus on the act of communication within the rhetorical 
approach is advantageous since it highlights that texts are used by people in the world. 
However, the emphasis on fictionality as an interpretative supposition raises the question of 
how readers conceptualize the intentions of discourse producers. This “underrating of the 
reception side in the communicative process” (Wilderkamp, van Montfoort, & van Ruiswijk, 
1980, p. 554) has been cited as a problem with pragmatic approaches since their inception 
and is, furthermore, the motivation behind adding situational context into the account 
(Wilderkamp et al., 1980, pp. 550–552). 
In summary, these approaches each offer valuable contributions to the study of 
fictionality: the liberation of the concept of fictionality from the strictly fictional (e.g., the 
literary work), the mapping of narrative ontologies, recognition of users and uses of 
fictionality in communicative interaction, and the contextual potential of textual features as 
signposts. However, no approach distinguishes itself as sufficient in accounting for the 
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cognitive processes involved in interpretations of fictionality nor of the resultant experiential 
impact of such appraisals. A cognitive approach to fictionality is therefore urgently needed. 
 
 
Foundations for a Cognitive Approach to Fictionality 
 
In a debate article considering interconnections and divergences between the unnatural 
(rhetorical) approach to fictionality
3
 and a potential cognitive approach, Nielsen claims that 
cognitive approaches have exhibited a “neglect of, and indifference to, what is specifically 
fictional about literary and fictional narratives” (Kukkonen & Nielsen, 2018, pp. 475–476). 
Kukkonen rejoins by acknowledging that it is rare to find an “explicit theorization about how 
the fictional quality of the texts […] affects cognitive processes differently from nonfictional 
texts” (Kukkonen & Nielsen, 2018, p. 478). Kukkonen highlights the widely held belief, 
across the cognitive sciences and cognitive literary studies, that the same mental processes 
that are in force in everyday life also apply in literary reading (cf. Stockwell 2002; Herman 
2013). Indeed, functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) shows overlapping activation 
patterns in the brain when responding to factual or fictional cues (Abraham, von Cramon, & 
Schubotz, 2008; Altmann, Borhn, Lubrich, Menninghaus, & Jacobs, 2014). However, 
Nielsen’s assertion that critics working in cognitive paradigms are indifferent to fictionality is 
an overstatement. Whilst fictionality is seldom addressed per se, the processes and 
experiences of mental representation, imagination, and emotional response that occur when 
engaging with both fictional and non-fictional discourse are central to work in cognitive 
narratology (Herman 2002), cognitive stylistics/poetics (Stockwell, 2002, 2009; Gavins & 
Steen, 2003; Gavins, 2007), and empirical reader response studies (Gerrig, 1993; Gerrig & 
Rapp, 2004; Whiteley, 2010, 2011; Whiteley & Canning, 2017). A cognitive account that 
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explicitly engages with fictionality is, admittedly though, in an embryonic state. In this 
section, I discuss significant precursors and empirical findings. 
Iser’s The Fictive and the Imaginary (1993) is a proto-cognitive discussion of 
fictionality (Gibbons 2014; Kukkonen & Nielsen, 2018).
4
 His approach shares affinities with 
pre-existing approaches through attention to imaginative world-building (semantic), textual 
elements (syntactic), and intentionality (pragmatic). Iser advocates a triadic model, involving 
three ontologies: the real, the fictive, and the imaginary. He claims that textual features are 
not in and of themselves signposts of fictionality, but often signal through convention (Iser, 
1993, p. 11) and are selected by authors and partly used by readers to deduce intentionality 
and fictionality (pp. 6, 12). Texts, therefore, serve to “provide the medium through which [the 
imaginary] emerges” (p. 2). Any fictionalizing act “stimulates attitudes toward an unreal 
world” (p. 20) – the imaginary. In the imaginary, including where the fictive world resembles 
the real world, “the world represented is bracketed” off from reality but construed by readers 
“as if it were real” (p. 15; original emphasis). Fictionality in this view is a cognitive attitude 
on the part of readers, based on textual features and their interpretation of author 
intentionality. Furthermore, the relationship between real, fictive, and imaginary is dynamic; 
just as real-world experiences influence details of the imaginary world, fictional experiences 
can impact real-world judgments. 
The exceptionality of fiction, what Iser (1993) sees as “bracketing off” (p. 13), is 
evidenced in empirical research. Altmann et al. (2014) showed real readers a series of short 
narratives but manipulated the preliminary information about whether a text was ‘real’ or 
‘invented’. Their results suggest that whilst reading both fiction and non-fiction necessitates 
generating mental representations, the process is not identical: “reading facts seems to elicit 
mental simulation processes basically regarding actions and their outcomes, reading fiction 
appears to initiate simulation processes especially concerning the motives behind an action 
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and thereby the protagonist’s mind” (Altmann et al., 2014, p. 27). Readers therefore create 
mental representations regardless, but in imagining fictional worlds their emotional and 
empathetic responses are more actively engaged. Yang and Xue (2014) gathered 
electroencephalogram (EEG) data using text comprehension tasks. Participants were 
presented with a sentence in which the initial clause introduced characters (e.g., ‘Harry Potter 
was talking with Hermione’) and a subsequent clause added another character who was either 
compatible or incompatible (e.g., ‘suddenly Lord Voldemort appeared’ vs. ‘suddenly Colin 
Powell appeared’). The data suggests that inconsistency in ontological conditions is easily 
detected. This is also the case for clashes between different fictional worlds though 
differentiating reality from fiction “is easier than distinguishing fiction from fiction” (Yang & 
Xue, 2015, p. 170). 
Wilderkamp et al. (1980) published perhaps the earliest empirical study on fictionality. 
Their questionnaire yielded interesting results. Formulaic sentences, such as ‘Once upon a 
time’, are not “a sufficient guarantee of fictionality” (Wilderkamp et al., 1980, p. 561); they 
cue fictionality but readers withhold judgment to see what follows. In terms of text-based 
markers generally, readers with more prior reading experience are more likely to interpret 
textual features as signposts of fictionality. This shows that fictionality judgments are 
contextually situated and readers’ existing knowledge and literary competencies influence 
their appraisal. Whilst references to mythical beings (‘dwarves’) appear to necessarily entail 
fictionality, the opposite is not the case for nouns with referentiality (‘Amsterdam’) since 
readers can accept these as fictional when assigned a new fictional context (e.g., there is an 
Amsterdam in an invented country). The researchers explain this by arguing for the 
importance of the internal consistency of worlds. Ultimately, Wilderkamp, van Montfoort, 
and van Ruiswijk (1980) conclude that the “role of the receiver in the communication process 
thus involves the interaction between pragmatic, semantic, and syntactic features” (p. 552). 
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The empirical studies discussed in this section suggest that readers construct mental 
representations. There is empirical evidence for world ontologies (the differentiation and 
importance of consistency), the potentiality of signposts, and the contextual situation of the 
communication – all of which also featured in Iser’s thinking. As such, it is important to 
maintain these within a cognitive approach to fictionality. 
 
 
The Cognitive Approach: Text World Theory and Mind-Modelling  
 
Building on previous work (Gibbons, 2014), I propose a cognitive approach to fictionality 
using Text World Theory (Werth, 1999; Gavins, 2007).
5
 Whilst Possible Worlds Theory is a 
model of logic, Text World Theory is a cognitive account of discourse processing, developed 
from cognitive science and refined through reader-response research. Text World Theory is 
ideal because it complements Iser’s emphasis on the imaginary and the previously discussed 
empirical evidence that people create mental representations when processing language. Such 
imagined mental representations are text-worlds. Each text-world is distinguished based on 
“essential differences” of “ontological status” (Gavins, 2007, p. 76). Text-worlds are 
populated by enactors, a term used instead of character to allow for multiple versions (such 
as past-selves). Deictic patterns in texts are world-building, generating the parameters of text-
worlds by signifying time, space/location, and the people and objects therein. Readers 
“project” into these text-worlds, taking an imagined “cognitive stance” (Duchan, Bruder, & 
Hewitt, 1995; Whiteley, 2011). Changes to the parameters as well as negation and modality 
cause world-switches, generating new ontologically distinct text-worlds. Within text-worlds, 
function advancers progress the narrative, for example through actions, and are usually 
associated with verb phrases. In contradistinction, the discourse-world represents the real-
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world context in which participants, who bring with them existing knowledge, engage in 
communication. The discourse-world is split in most written communication, with 
participants separated in space and time. Diagrams are often, though not always, used to 
visually map the ontological structure of text-worlds and to show the relation of text-worlds 
to each other and to the discourse-world. World-builders are usually named in diagrams 
whilst function-advancing propositions are represented with arrows. 
The fictionality or ontological status of text-worlds is, I argue, cognitively assigned by 
readers. Understanding fictionality and ontology as attributes of worlds formed through 
cognitive appraisals enables an explanation (and, indeed, acknowledges the possibility) of 
readers forming fictionality judgments of a text that differ to the intentions of an author. 
Indeed, in arguing for the benefits of Text World Theory, Werth highlights the Theory’s 
foundational belief that “discourses are ‘world-building ventures’, and that even the ‘actual 
world’, also know as ‘reality’ (part of what constitutes the discourse world), is a mental 
construct. This means that there is no principled, logical difference between the actual world 
and imaginative and speculative text worlds” (Werth, 1999, p. 263). Fictionality judgments 
are therefore based on contextually situated interpretations of textual features and world-
building information along with interpretations of authorial intentionality. Werth (1999) says 
as much in his explanation that truth-assessments are a two-part process: “calculating the 
truth or probability of the propositions in the text” through recourse to relevant extratextual 
knowledge and “modifying that calculation in terms of the reliability and the claims of the 
speaker” (p. 211). 
The purported import of authorial intentionality on fictionality judgment makes a 
cognitively informed framework even more essential. The question of the author has 
historically plagued literary and narratological criticism. Wimsatt and Beardsley (1946), 
amongst others, dismiss authorial intentionality as immaterial and unavailable. Contrastingly, 
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Booth (1983) seeks to account for the author’s centrality in interpretation by postulating the 
“implied author” whilst Irvin (2006) revises authorial intentionality as a hypothetical 
intentionalism as a means of acknowledging that intentionality is, inevitably, constructed by 
readers. Burke (2008) ultimately resigns that although “authorial subjectivity is theoretically 
unassimilable, it cannot be practically circumvented” (p. 183). From a cognitive perspective, 
as Stockwell (2016) argues, readers “treat literary works as having some sort of access to 
authorial lives” (p. 149).6 Whilst intentionality is seen as central to fictionality judgments 
then (most notably in pragmatic/rhetorical accounts), it too must be regarded as a cognitive 
process of assessment in order to account for reader responses and to resolve the issue of 
theoretical availability raised by Burke. 
Cognitive models such as Theory of Mind offer insight into the human ability to 
attribute mental states to others (for a summary, see Leslie, 2001). Theory of mind has been 
used to account for how readers construct the minds of characters (Zunshine, 2006; 
Stockwell, 2009). Stockwell (2016) has additionally made the case that “[a]uthorial intention 
is a cognitive model, built and enriched by the reader’ (p. 160). He articulates: 
 
The real-world relationship that lies between actuality and fictionality is, of course, 
the author-reader relationship, and this brings us back to a resolution of the key issue 
within authorial intention: in both fictional and actual encounters, we assume 
intentionality and can then model a hypothetical intention on the basis of that 
presumption. (Stockwell, 2016, pp. 152–153.) 
 
Cognitive processes of mind-modelling are therefore the foundation of interpretive judgments 
about authorial intention. Stockwell argues that readers derive a “preferred reading” 
(Stockwell, 2013, pp. 268–269, 2016, p. 154) from their authorial mind-model. This preferred 
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reading includes a stance on fictionality, amongst other elements. For instance, elsewhere I 
have considered the significance of authorial mind-models as part of readers’ ethical 
responses to texts (Gibbons, 2019; cf. Stockwell, 2013). 
Text World Theory and mind-modelling are principally suited to the analysis of 
fictionality for three reasons: first, Text World Theory is a text-driven approach which, in its 
attention to textual features, can consider potential signposts of fictionality; second, it 
provides rigorous ontological mapping of imagined text-worlds; and third, it is context-
sensitive and therefore, complemented by mind-modelling, its recognition of the shared act of 
communication includes consideration of authorial production and intentionality alongside 
reader response. I now put this cognitive approach to fictionality into practice and, in doing 
so, evidence the value of the critical synthesis of Text World Theory and mind-modelling 
offered herein. 
 
 
Dissolving Margins in Elena Ferrante’s Neapolitan Novels 
 
Italian author Elena Ferrante’s first novel appeared in 1992 and was subsequently published 
in English in 2005. The Neapolitan quartet has, particularly, received critical acclaim: the 
second book, The Story of A New Name, was shortlisted for the American Best Translated 
Book Award in 2014; the final book, The Story of the Lost Child, was a New York Times 
Book Review best book of 2015, a finalist for the Italian Strega Prize the same year, and 
nominated for the Man Brooker International Prize in 2016. As with written discourse 
generally, the discourse-worlds of the Neapolitan novels are split, with Elena Ferrante and 
her readers separated in space and time. With regards to My Brilliant Friend, Elena Ferrante 
as author-participant wrote the book prior to its 2012 publication, thus there is an inevitable 
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delay between the author-participant’s writing and reader-participants’ reception; I, for 
instance, read the book in 2018. 
Paratextual framing is often cited as an important signpost of fictionality (Walsh, 2007, 
p. 45) even though it “may be ambiguous and not all-decisive” (Nielsen et al., 2015, p. 67). 
The front cover of the English translation of Elena Ferrante’s My Brilliant Friend features the 
description “Book One of the Neapolitan Novels”, a phrase repeated on each subsequent 
book (with the number in the series altered, as appropriate).
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 The copyright page bears the 
disclaimer, “This is a work of fiction. Any references to historical events, real people, or real 
locales are used fictitiously”. Each book also includes an ‘Index of Characters’. The paratext 
of Ferrante’s novels therefore clearly signals fictionality. Nonetheless, readers and critics 
often read an autobiographical trace in the Neapolitan novels: Mallick speaks of the “semi-
autobiographical novels of Elena Ferrante and Karl Ove Knausgaard” (Mallick, 2015); 
Cummins lists Ferrante alongside Rachel Cusk, Ben Lerner, and Knausgaard as “writers 
grouped under autofiction’s umbrella” (Cummins, 2018); McCleen pronounces that “two of 
the critical darlings and bestsellers” of contemporary autofiction are “Karl Ove Knausgaards’ 
My Struggle series and Elena Ferrante’s Neapolitan saga” (McCleen, 2018); and Jensen 
(2018) argues, “[w]riters such as [Rachel] Cusk, Karl Ove Knausgaard and Elena Ferrante, 
for example, draw upon the temporal demands of multivolume autofictions to induce readers 
to consider at great length the extraordinary power of words, ideas, images and everyday 
events” (p. 76). 
Whilst “there is no single definition of autofiction” (Dyx, 2018, p. 3), it is generally 
understood as a genre descriptor for literary works featuring the author and focusing on 
events from the author’s life that are nevertheless (to lesser or greater extents) fictionalized. 
Autofiction is, therefore, a hybrid literary form, which sits at the intersection between 
autobiography and fiction. In his attempt to define autobiography, Lejeune (1989) undertook 
14 
what has since become a highly influential comparative linguistic mapping of autobiography 
and fiction. His insights are particularly useful for a cognitive approach to fictionality since 
he claims to consider texts “from the position of the reader” (Lejeune, 1989, p. 4). In contrast, 
“starting from within the mind of the author” – that is, a mind that cannot be known – “poses 
a problem” (p. 4). Ultimately, the key features of texts that offer readers what Lejeune calls 
“an autobiographical pact” (in contrast to a “fictional pact”) are: the self-identicalness of 
author, narrator, and protagonist; the subject matter’s focus on an individual life; and the 
adoption of retrospective point of view (p. 4). Lejeune does not use the term ‘autofiction’, 
though he suggests that such texts would entail a “phantasmatic pact” (see also Gibbons, 
2018) and wonders: “Can the hero of a novel declared as such have the same name as the 
author?” (Lejeune, 1989, p. 18). Building on Lejeune’s thinking, Genette (1993) studies the 
voice dynamics of autofiction, contending that the relationship is: syntactic between narrator 
and character, through the use of first-person homodiegetic narration; semantic between 
author and character in that the “author [is] responsible for the acts of his hero”; and 
pragmatic between author and narrator, since this “symbolizes the author’s serious 
commitment with regard to the narrative” (p. 78). Lejeune’s and Genette’s accounts of 
stylistic features which mark a text as autobiographical or autofictional are valuable since 
they can be used to ascertain whether Ferrante’s novels appear textually similar to 
autobiography. If so, style could be a significant factor in readers’ and critics’ categorizations 
of the Neapolitan quartet as autofictional and/or autobiographical. 
My analysis is structured in three parts, moving outwards from text to context. Firstly, 
it utilizes Text World Theory’s analytical power in conducting a text-driven investigation of 
potential signposts of fictionality or referentiality in the Neapolitian Quartet. As part of this, it 
specifically considers the ontology of the generated Text World structures and the syntactic 
voice relations between narrator and character. The analysis then begins to link text with 
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context by secondly, considering the ontological liminality of narration and the ways in 
which readers build an authorial mind-model and use extra-textual discourse-world 
knowledge across semantic and pragmatic voice relations to connect character and narrator 
with author. Thirdly and finally, the analysis considers the responses of critics as readers to 
the fictionality of the text and the impact of Elena Ferrante’s pseudonym on assessments of 
authorial intentionality and the authorial mind-model. 
 
Dissolving Fictionality 
 
The prologue of My Brilliant Friend begins: “This morning Rino telephoned. I thought he 
wanted money again and I was ready to say no. But that was not the reason for the phone call: 
his mother was gone” (Ferrante, 2012, p. 19). In these opening lines, a first-person narrator is 
immediately introduced. The initial text-world is empty because no other information about 
the narratorial situation is given (Gavins, 2007, p. 133). This is therefore presented in grey in 
Figure 1. Readers are peripherally aware of this world because the use of I implies a 
communicative context. The adverbial “This morning”, past-tense narration, and internal 
focalization present an immediate world-switch. All subsequent text-worlds therefore 
temporally precede the act of narration and are epistemic in nature. The fixed focalization 
means that readers project into the narrator’s cognitive stance to experience the text from her 
point of view (Gavins, 2007, pp. 131–135). The retrospective narration here generates a “split 
self” (Lakoff, 1996; Emmott, 2002), whereby readers distinguish between two enactors of the 
narrator: the narrating-I and the past-tense experiencing-I (Cohn, 1978). Whilst signposts of 
fictionality or referentiality are not absolute, the initial style of the prologue does contain 
formal features associated with autobiography: retrospective narration is used (Lejeune, 1989, 
p. 4) and there is a correspondence between narrator and character. 
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“@@ Insert Figure 1 approximately here” 
Figure 1: Text-World Diagram for opening to My Brilliant Friend (Ferrante, 2012, p. 19) 
 
The second text-world encapsulates Rino and the narrator on the telephone but the 
thought presentation causes another world-switch. A chain of world-switches subsequently 
occur, resulting from the boulomaic verb ‘wanted’, the hypotheticality of ‘I was ready’, and 
the (hypothetical) direct speech ‘no’. Subsequently, the anaphoric reference of ‘that was not 
the reason for the phone call’ foregrounds the previous text-worlds in which Rino ‘wanted 
money’. The syntactic negation, though, causes what Gavins (2007) calls a “world-repair” 
(pp. 141–142) in which Rino’s motives are negated (shown by the dashed text-world 
encapsulating the relevant prior text-worlds). These text-worlds increasingly represent the 
event from the narrator’s perspective, as she considers Rino’s motives and her possible 
reactions. However, since this is introduced by homodiegetic direct thought (‘I thought he 
wanted…), the reader is not afforded privileged access to Rino’s consciousness. 
In Text World terms, this is related to accessibility (Werth, 1999; Gavins, 2007). 
Gavins explains: 
 
Our mental representations of enactors in the text-world are, of course, based on our 
experience of real people in the real world, and we expect both types of entities to 
have the same emotions, reactions, abilities, and general behaviour. However, we also 
retain our understanding of text-world enactors as entities outside the ontological 
parameters of our real world. Not only are we unable to question or negotiate directly 
with enactors who are confined to the text-world level, but our knowledge of their 
backgrounds and personalities is similarly limited to information provided in the text. 
(Gavins, 2007, p. 78.) 
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The ontological gap between participants and enactors motivates the distinction between 
participant-accessibility and character/enactor-accessibility: whilst the “hopes and beliefs 
and speculations [of characters/enactors] are reported by way of the discourse, they are 
inaccessible to the participants in the sense that since characters are not participants, they are 
not bound by the principles of the discourse” (Werth, 1999, p. 189). Accessibility, in turn, 
connects to judgments of reliability since participants can more easily assess other 
participant’s beliefs (precisely like readers judging authorial intentionality) than those of 
enactors, which are only true or reliable relative to the text-world. The modal text-worlds of 
Rino’s motivations (as imagined by the narrator) are therefore enactor-accessible and the 
narrator’s homodiegetic direct thought presentation fits with the stylistic features of non-
fiction. 
Finally, the semantic negation in ‘his mother was gone’, like all negation, has a 
foregrounding effect which produces a negative text-world (Werth, 1999; Hidalgo Downing, 
2000; Gavins, 2007): Readers must imagine the mother in the negative text-world in order to 
understand her disappearance from the world in which Rino and the narrator are 
communicating. At this point, therefore, Rino’s mother is a “lacuna”, a concept Stockwell 
develops from gestalt perception to explain objects that are experienced by readers as felt 
absences. Lacunae create resonant effects, and as such Rino’s mother has an “aura of 
significance” (Stockwell, 2009, p. 18; cf. McLoughlin, 2013, 2016, 2019). A page later, the 
narrator elaborates, “Rino’s mother is named Rafaella Cerullo, but everyone has always 
called her Lina. Not me, I’ve never used either her first name or her last. To me, for more 
than sixty years, she’s been Lila” (Ferrante, 2012, p. 19). 
The stylistic likeness of My Brilliant Friend to autobiography starts to diminish here, at 
least following Lejeune’s principles since he suggests that the subject of autobiography “must 
be primarily individual life” (Lejeune, 1989, p. 4; original emphasis). As the title of Book 
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One implies, the Neapolitan Quartet tells the entwined stories of both the narrator and Lila. 
Nevertheless, the focalization (mostly) remains fixed with the narrator: Lila’s experiences are 
typically mediated using reporting clauses to interject (e.g., “Lila told us” (Ferrante, 2012, p. 
84), “Lila told me” (p. 131), “according to Lila” (pp. 170, 171)). When first describing Lila’s 
impression of “dissolving margins”, for example, the narrator prefaces: “The term isn’t mine, 
she always used it. She said that on those occasions the outlines of people and things 
suddenly dissolved…” (Ferrante, 2012, p. 89). As Figure 2 depicts, this indirect speech 
enables readers to project into an epistemic text-world of Lila’s experience, encouraged by 
the temporal shift in ‘on those occasions’. A notable exception occurs in the third book, 
Those Who Leave and Those who Stay, when Lila first confides to the narrator about her 
distressing experience of dissolving margins (although apparently she doesn’t use the term 
until later (Ferrante, 2015, p. 175)). Reporting clauses – such as “she realized” (Ferrante, 
2014, p. 128), “she thought” (p. 129) – do repeatedly interject but the stylistic presentation of 
Lila’s account oscillates, using direct speech and thought as well as free indirect and free 
direct forms (e.g., “maybe it would shatter the child, yes, it would shatter him like a plastic 
puppet” (p. 129), “No, no, enough, in the past she had done it for different reasons” (p. 130), 
“Ah, Lina Cerulla, you are beyond correction” (p. 163)), which will, albeit fluctuatingly, 
prompt readers to project into Lila’s cognitive stance, generating insight into Lila’s 
consciousness. Nevertheless, text-world architecture shows that this imaginative alignment is 
the product of world-switches that, once again, stem from narratorial description; in Figure 2, 
for instance, into Lila’s perspective and into a negative-world caused by ‘dissolved’. 
Reporting clauses thus emphasize that Lila told this to the narrator who (re-)presents it in 
narration. Despite the Neapolitan Quartet telling both Lila’s and the narrator’s life stories, the 
stylistic presentation emphasizes that Lila’s experiences are relayed in enactor-accessible 
text-worlds. This, therefore, would not necessarily problematize an autobiographical reading. 
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“@@ Insert Figure 2 approximately here” 
Figure 2: Text-World Diagram for “She said that on those occasions…” (Ferrante, 2012, p. 89) 
 
This brief Text World analysis provides insight into readers’ imaginative and emotional 
engagements: because the text allows readers to project into text-worlds that give insight into 
both the narrator’s and Lila’s experiences, they are also likely to emotionally engage with 
both of these characters. In terms of fictionality, Lila’s centrality in the story is, according to 
Lejeune, atypical of autobiography; nevertheless, the narrator-character correlation and 
retrospective homodiegetic narration are characteristic. Text World analysis thus starts to 
show why readers might interpret the Neapolitan Quartet autofictionally. However, a crucial 
stylistic component of autofiction is the correlation between not just protagonist and narrator, 
but also author. Consequently, in the next section, I reflect on how readers conceptualize 
authors and explore the semantic and pragmatic voice relations that connect character and 
narrator with author. 
 
Dissolving Authorship 
 
In a 1991 letter to her publisher, Elena Ferrante claims, “I believe that books, once they are 
written, have no need of their authors” (Ferrante, 2016, p. 15).8 Ferrante is an elusive, 
mysterious figure who refuses to appear publically and responds to interviews only in 
writing. Stockwell (2016) suggests that mind-models of authors “start off with a rough 
template of person-ness, and then the patterns of the text drive that model” (p. 151). This 
process of building a mind-model relates to what social psychologists call “impression 
formation” (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990, p. 1). Impression formation is initially “category-based”, 
using easily available information that activates social meanings (such as physical features, 
roles, stereotypes), and is subsequently fine-tuned or debunked based on “attribute-
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orientated” information which increments people’s individual traits. Gavins (2007) asserts 
that even if the author-participant is not familiar in real life, “the gender-specificity of their 
name, their title (if any), and even whether their name is popular in contemporary society or 
not, can affect how we perceive and evaluate our co-participant and the language they 
produce” (p. 27). The exemplary features Gavins suggests are category-based, and will 
enable readers to begin building an authorial mind-model. Elena Ferrante is female (or so her 
name suggests) and her bio, as published on the Neapolitan novel covers, informs readers that 
she was “born in Naples”. In the novel’s themselves – both in the ‘Index of Characters’ and 
throughout the Quartet – the narrator is identified as ‘Elena Greco’. Genette (1993, p. 79), 
Lejeune (1989), and Cohn (1999, pp. 123–124) see the author-narrator relation as the most 
important voice-dynamic separating autobiography from fiction. Whilst the surname ‘Greco’ 
(in its distinctness from ‘Ferrante’) disrupts the unity of author-narrator-character, the 
forename ‘Elena’ is shared. As such, Elena Ferrante’s forename, gender, and birthplace 
connect with the setting and narrator-character of the Neapolitan novels, and therefore still 
permit (at least partially) an autobiographical or autofictional reading, encouraging readers to 
conceptually associate the narrator with their mind-model for the author. 
Interestingly, in My Brilliant Friend’s prologue, the narrator is only named – by Rino in 
conversation – as “Elena” (Ferrante, 2012, p. 19), at the end of which she confesses that it is 
in reaction to Lila’s disappearance that she “turned on the computer and began to write – all 
the details of our story, everything that remained in my memory” (p. 23). The prologue 
therefore does not make textually explicit the difference in surname between the narrator and 
Ferrante and also frames Elena’s and Lila’s interconnected life stories as the narrator’s 
autobiographical memories. Moreover, there are frequent metatextual references to writing 
throughout the Quartet. For instance, in Those who Leave and Those who Stay, the narrator 
reflects: 
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For weeks now I’ve been writing at a good pace, without wasting time rereading. If Lila 
was alive—I imagine as I sip my coffee and look out at the Po, bumping against the 
piers of the Principessa Isabella bridge—she won’t be able to resist, she’ll come and 
poke around in my computer, she’ll read… (Ferrante, 2014, p. 29.) 
 
Such metatextual comments, furthermore, feature immediate and proximal deictics, such as 
the present tense employed in ‘I imagine as I sip my coffee’, suggesting that the act of writing 
is simultaneous to the text-world of narration. The effect is to position the narration as 
autodiegetic writing and enhance the illusion that the narrator Elena is the writer of the 
Neapolitan Quartet. This complicates issues of ontology and accessibility. 
The concept of accessibility comes to Text World Theory from Possible Worlds Theory 
(Werth, 1999, p. 70; Gavins, 2007, p. 12) wherein it was concerned with the “relative 
closeness” of worlds (Lewis, 1973; cited in Werth, 1999, p. 70). The illusion of narrator-
Elena as the real author makes the text-world of narration feel closer to the reader’s reality 
and problematizes readers’ felt sense of accessibility. When analyzing a parenting manual 
called The Baby Whisperer, Gavins (2007, pp. 74–80) argues that the first-person narration of 
the author Tracy Hogg produces participant-accessible text-worlds that readers expect to be 
true and reliable whilst entities nominated by Hogg (even those which represent real-people 
such as the parents in Hogg’s case studies) exist in enactor-accessible text-worlds. Tracy 
Hogg as narrator of The Baby Whisperer and Elena Greco as narrator of the Neapolitan 
Quarter are both text-world enactors, likewise represented through I-narration. The only 
difference, therefore, in ontology and accessibility is whether these Is are text-world 
counterparts of discourse-world author-participants. Indeed, Lanser (2005) argues that “I-
narrative taunts us with the possibility that the “I” of the fiction has some relation with the 
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author’s ‘I’” (p. 207). It thus allows for referfictional ambiguity so that readers can “oscillate” 
between interpretive stances. Narration, therefore, needs to recognized in Text World Theory 
and in studies of fictionality as a liminal ontological space whilst the concept of accessibility 
is inadequate because it is entirely dependent on fictionality assessments. 
Characteristic of autofiction (Gibbons, 2018), there are numerous references to 
authorship in the Neapolitan novels, which may further encourage readers to connect 
narrating character Elena with an authorial mind-model of Ferrante. Elena even writes 
autofiction. Initially, in The Story of a New Name, she relays her act of writing a third-person 
autobiographical account of an early sexual experience (Ferrante, 2013, p. 433) which she 
subsequently refers to as “a novel” (p. 345) and, by the end of the book, it is published as 
such. In the final book, The Story of the Lost Child, the narrator produces “a new novel by 
Elena Greco, a story set in an unknown Naples” (Ferrante, 2015, p. 270; original italics) 
based on her life experience growing up in a poor neighbourhood and which a journalist 
apparently reads “as a sort of autobiography” (p. 259). This is followed years later with a 
book whose title – “A Friendship” – echoes that of Book 1 of the Neapolitan novels – My 
Brilliant Friend – and that the narrator describes as telling “concisely, with the necessary 
disguises, the story of our lives” (Ferrante, 2015, p. 465). The Naples setting of Elena 
Greco’s writing enhances the parallels between the narrator and the author Elena Ferrante. 
Additionally, the repeated references to autobiographical fictions foreground the concept to 
readers, prompting them in turn to revisit their authorial mind-model – in particular, 
Ferrante’s preferred stance on fictionality. Readers will have different interpretations of the 
novels’ fictionality but for some readers, the significance given to autofiction in the 
Neapolitan Quartet will enable an interpretation of the fictional story of the narrator as an 
account of Ferrante’s life. 
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Lejeune reflects on what causes readers to correlate author-narrator-character when the 
names differ: 
 
In the case of the fictitious name (i.e. different from that of the author) given to a 
character who tells his life story, the reader has reason to think that the story lived by 
the character is precisely that of the author: by cross-checking with other texts, or by 
delving into external news items, or even by reading the narrative whose fictional 
appearance rings false… (Lejeune, 1989, pp. 12–13.) 
 
The metatextual elements I discuss above are text-internal and part of the latter process; 
features of the text give the reader cause to rethink fictionality/referentiality. The other two 
processes identified by Lejeune entail the reader drawing on extratextual discourse-world 
knowledge. All of these, which go beyond initial or immediate category-based impressions in 
order to connect the narrating-character to the author, entail attribute-oriented individuating 
impression formation to refine the authorial mind-model. Segnini (2017) does exactly this, 
noting that Elena Greco “shares several biographical traits with ‘Ferrante’” (p.110). The 
similarity is “not only her first name, but also her Neapolitan upbringing, her background as a 
Greek scholar, and her career as a novelist” (p.110). In making these connections, Segnini 
conceptually maps the textual details of narrator-character Elena Greco with extra-textual 
knowledge of author Elena Ferrante. Based on correlating the narrator-character with the 
author, in the process developing her mind-model of the author, Segnini subsequently 
suggests that these correspondences give the novels a “strong sense of authenticity” (p. 111). 
Using the concept of impression formation, this section has explored the cognitive 
processes readers use when they mind-model authors as well as the way in which they map 
traits belonging to narrator-characters with those known, extra-textually, about the author in 
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order to interpret the Neapolitan novels as, at least partially, autobiographical. In Segnini’s 
discussion, this seems strongly influenced by a “biographical impulse” (see Dow, 2016). 
 
Dissolving Intentionality 
 
Commenting on her own reading of the Neapolitan novels, Bojar states: 
 
I am one of the many readers who have gleaned insights into my own life from reading 
Ferrante’s books. The arc of the narrator’s life in the Neapolitan Quartet generally 
corresponds with mine, with the tremendous social/cultural changes of the 1960s and 
1970s affecting my life as it did the lives of Ferrante’s characters. I was born in 
September 1944, a month later than Lila and Elena. Until recently, I was convinced that 
Ferrante was a real woman born in 1944 because throughout the Neapolitan Quartet she 
had an unerring sense of what was happening in the world at each stage of Lila and 
Elena’s lives. (Bojar, 2018, p. 16). 
 
Bojar’s sense of having developed psychological insights is in keeping with Theory of Mind 
and empirical evidence that fiction engages social, empathetic reasoning (Oatley, 1999). Her 
identification with characters Elena and Lila suggests that she experienced what Kuiken, 
Miall, and Sikora (2004) call ‘self-implication’ and ‘expressive enactment’ which include 
“blurred boundaries between oneself” and characters, and “feelings in response to situations 
and events in the text” (p. 171). Additionally, Bojar’s emphasis on ‘1944’ as not only her 
own, Elena’s, and Lila’s birth year but also Ferrante’s, indicates that she has incremented 
imagined events from the novel and from her discourse-world knowledge and personal 
experiences of the 60s and 70s into her mind-model of Elena Ferrante.
9
 This suggests that 
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Bojar engages in multiple identity mappings: of herself with characters, characters with 
novelist, and novelist with herself. As such, in Bojar’s case, the felt authenticity or 
autofictionality of the Neapolitan novels is a conceptual conflation not only of author-
narrator-character voice dynamics, as in Lejeune’s and Genette’s theorizations, but of author-
narrator-character-reader identifications. Furthermore, the external realism of narrative details 
– the correlation between events in the Neapolitan Quartet and, for instance, the real 
“social/cultural changes of the 1960s and 1970s” – appears to have boosted Bojar’s emotional 
engagement, in turn making the novels feel ‘real’ (cf. Busselle & Bilandzic, 2008, p. 268). 
When Bojar (2018) confesses “[u]ntil recently, I was convinced that Ferrante was a real 
woman…” (p. 16), she is referring to the realization that ‘Elena Ferrante’ is a pseudonym. 
Pseudonyms pose problems for assessing authorial intentionality, precisely because they 
obscure information about authors. Ryan (2011) describes the complication of a pseudonym 
as a “thorny matter” and resultantly contends that implied authorship – by extension, 
intentionality – must be treated as “a reader construct highly dependent on contextual 
features” (p. 44). Moreover, the very awareness that ‘Elena Ferrante’ is a pseudonym will 
alter readers’ mind-models including their assessments of authorial intentionality and 
fictionality, and consequently their experience of the novels. For example, commenting on 
the Neapolitan Novels, Darwin writes: 
 
…the narrator is more of a neutral observer of the much more interesting, evasive and 
irresistible main character. Maybe Ferrante doesn’t care to share herself with her 
readers because then we would want to find Lila too. Or maybe she is Lila. In any case, 
I find it hard to believe that whoever Ferrante really is, this all did not happen. (Darwin, 
2016, no pagination) 
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Darwin construes semantic author-character relations here, despite the onomastic distinctness 
between Ferrante and Lila. This appears to be the product of two interrelated factors. The first 
is Lila’s ‘evasive’ character. Indeed, the previous Text World analysis revealed Lila as a 
lacuna or felt absence, making the character more attractive (‘interesting’, ‘irresistible’) to 
readers (cf. Stockwell, 2009). The second factor is Ferrante’s pseudonym, which makes the 
correlation between author and character names irrelevant because readers do not know the 
real author’s name. Darwin integrates her knowledge that Ferrante is using a pseudonym, and 
therefore desires anonymity, into her mind-model of the author and, by conceptually mapping 
this onto Lila’s desire to disappear in the Neapolitan novels, interprets a connection between 
Ferrante and Lila. This accentuates her appraisal of the Quartet as 
autobiographical/autofictional, wherein Lila is a text-world counterpart of the author. 
Ferrante and her publisher’s insistence on protecting the author’s identity caused 
speculation in the media as well as amongst critics and readers. A host of qualitative and 
quantitative text analyses (often using corpus software) have investigated Ferrante’s identity 
by comparing the language of the Neapolitan novels to those of other Italian writers. These 
studies resoundingly conclude that the Neapolitan novels are probably written by Domenico 
Starnone (Genilloud & Roten, 2016; Expert System, 2017; Tuzzi & Cortelazzo, 2018a; and 
the eight analyses collected in Tuzzi & Cortelazzo, 2018b). The revelation has proved 
challenging for many readers. As Bojar (2018) notes, “devoted readers have long considered 
this an impossibility […] because of the authenticity of her rendering of female experience” 
(p. 26). The pseudonym and the representation of female subjectivity in the Neapolitan 
novels lead readers to model the author as female, a characteristic they subsequently find 
difficult to repair or overwrite. Bojar’s report of her own and other readers’ refusal to engage 
with the idea of Ferrante as a man demonstrates the difficulty. In this instance, where the new 
information – that Ferrante is probably a man – challenges easy recategorisation, readers’ 
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impression of or mind-model for Ferrante must be reassembled in what Fiske and Neuberg 
call a “piecemeal” fashion (1990, p. 8). 
In 2016, Gatti supposedly exposed Ferrante’s real identity, claiming that “real estate 
and financial records point to Anita Raja, a Rome-based translator”. He continues, “Raja, 
who is married to the Neapolitan writer Domenico Starnone, is known to have had a 
relationship with Ferrante’s publishing house for many years as a translator of German 
literature” (Gatti, 2016, no pagination). Based on this and not satisfied with the idea of 
Ferrante as a man in real-life, Bojar (2018) discloses that she believes the Neapolitan Quartet 
are the result of joint authorship and the biographical details of Starnone’s Neapolitan 
background motivate her “guess” that “Starnone is the principal author” (p. 33). She 
additionally finds support for this interpretation by pointing to the thematization of authorial 
collaboration in the novels (p. 30). 
The responses of critics and/as readers discussed in this section of the analysis suggest 
that readers’ perceptions of the external realism of the novels and their own self-implication 
and expressive enactment can make fictions feel more real and thus influence judgments of 
fictionality. Pseudonymic authorship problematizes the question of authorial intentionality 
and resultantly means that, because readers cannot take for granted the category-based 
biographical details gleaned from their initial impressions of the author, the process of 
(re)building the authorial mind-model becomes increasingly individuated and piecemeal. 
Readers consequently appear to draw on any available attributes, including the author’s 
desire for anonymity. 
 
 
Conclusion 
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In this article, I have pioneered a cognitive approach to fictionality and authorial 
intentionality. Using Text World Theory and mind-modelling enables a text-driven and 
context-sensitive analysis. This is important because readers’ assessments are formed through 
a combination of paratextual and textual features, extra-textual and situational knowledge, 
and their own emotional engagements with narrative. I applied the approach to Elena 
Ferrante’s Neapolitan Quartet, a fitting test case precisely because the fictionality is 
complicated and controversial. Ferrante’s pseudonymic authorship obscures assessments of 
intentionality, leading readers to form impressions of the author through a piecemeal 
assemblage of individual traits. 
Many Ferrante readers reject or negotiate the paratextual signals of fiction, instead 
reading the text autofictionally. The case of Elena Ferrante’s Neapolitan novels therefore 
suggests that autofiction is not only a literary genre, but also a reading strategy. Wilderkamp, 
van Montfoort, and van Ruiswijk assert: 
 
like the producer, [the reader] is ‘allowed’ to deviate from the standard rules and 
norms. It is therefore conceivable that a text or sentence is received differently from the 
intentions of the author, for instance under the influence of a certain lack of information 
concerning production strategies or situational conditions of production; lack of 
knowledge of interpretation strategies, a ‘creative’ contribution of the receiver as well 
as the situational conditions of reception can have the same effect. (Wilderkamp et al., 
1980, p. 552). 
 
My analysis shows that a cognitive approach, using Text World Theory and mind-modelling, 
traces how readers form their interpretive judgments of fictionality and intentionality. The 
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cognitive unpinning of the analysis means that this is possible regardless of whether readers’ 
appraisals accord with their interpretation of an author’s preferred stance. 
Although many readers’ experiences of the Neapolitan Quartet’s fictionality (or, 
indeed, autofictionality) are contrary to paratextual signals, Ferrante’s pseudonymity is itself 
a cultivation of ontological distortion. Emre (2018) speaks of Ferrante’s anonymity as “an 
expressive strategy” with a deliberate “style and goals” (no pagination) whilst Bakopoulos 
(2016) writes that although “Ferrante does not call her work autofiction, she has noted that 
the Neapolitan novels stem from a complicated friendship she experienced but will not say 
more than that” (p. 400). In The Story of the Lost Child, Elena even reports, “Eh, [Lila] said 
once, what a fuss for a name: famous or not, it’s only a ribbon tied around a sack randomly 
filled with blood, flesh, words, shit, and petty thoughts” (Ferrante, 2015, p. 455). As Bojar’s 
comments above demonstrate, an author’s name does matter to readers since it forms part of 
readers’ initial category-based impression formation upon which they build an authorial 
mind-model and which, in turn, impacts assessments of fictionality and readers’ emotional 
engagement. 
At the end of the Neapolitan Quartet, the narrator muses: “Unlike stories, real life, 
when it has passed, inclines towards obscurity, not clarity” (Ferrante, 2015, p. 473). On the 
contrary, the fictionality of Ferrante’s stories is obscure with many stylistic features 
encouraging or acting as potential signposts of autobiography. Likewise, Ferrante’s use of a 
pseudonym obscures rather than illuminates. It is perhaps, therefore, telling that in Lila’s 
experience of ‘dissolving margins’, “people, even more than things, lost their boundaries and 
overflowed into shapelessness” (Ferrante, 2013, p. 355). Despite the temptation to think of 
the borderlines between fictionality and referentiality as clear-cut and unflinching, and even 
though the distinction does have experiential consequences for readers, Elena Ferrante 
appears to court autofictional enigma. Ultimately, with little ‘true’ or ‘verifiable’ biographical 
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information about Ferrante to draw on, readers have only the Neapolitan novels and 
Ferrante’s oeuvre with which to form their impressions of the author and of fictionality. 
Elena, a potential text-world counterpart of the author, identifies her role in narrating her own 
and Lila’s lives, writing: “I who have written for months and months and months to give her 
a form whose boundaries won’t dissolve” (Ferrante, 2015, p. 466). In fact, it isn’t that the 
boundaries of ‘Elena Ferrante’ and the Neapolitan Quartet have dissolved; rather, they are yet 
to solidify. 
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Notes 
                                                          
1 Frequent references to the concept of ‘dissolving margins’ occur (and recur) throughout the 
Neapolitan Quartet: in My Brilliant Friend (2012, pp. 89, 90, 176–177, 180, 265); The Story 
of a New Name (2013, p. 355), Those who Leave and Those who Stay (2014, pp. 106, 128, 
155, 167), and The Story of the Lost Child (2015, pp. 175–176, 215, 371, 466). 
2
 Resultantly, Stockwell adapts Possible Worlds Theory into what he calls “discourse worlds” 
(2002, pp. 91–104). 
3
 It is unusual to find reference to an unnatural approach to fictionality in the literature. 
Henrik Skov Nielsen works with unnatural narratology and the rhetorical approach to 
fictionality. Unnatural fictionality is consequently affiliated, in many ways, with the 
rhetorical approach. 
4
 My argument for Iser (1993) as a predecessor of the cognitive approach is even stronger 
when one notes that he draws on the cognitive framework figure and ground, developed from 
visual perception (throughout, though particularly see pp. 7, 17). 
5
 Unless otherwise stated, all Text World Theory terms explained here come from Werth 
(1999) and Gavins (2007) who provide detailed overviews of the framework. 
6
 In fact, this is also the case for some critics: Bojar (2018) – in speaking about her own 
encounter with Elena Ferrante and the Neapolitan novels – admits, “I have tried to suppress 
the impulse to extract a biographical core from Ferrante’s novels, but the desire persists” (p. 
33). 
7
 For analysis of Ferrante’s covers, see Segnini (2017). 
8
 Many, though not all, of the letters published in Ferrante’s non-fiction collection 
Frantumaglia were sent to the publisher or are in fact categorized as “unsent”. It therefore 
40 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
becomes a matter of trust as to whether readers believe that these letters pre-existed 
Frantumaglia or whether they were written specifically for the volume. 
9
 To the best of my knowledge, Ferrante’s birth year is not provided in her official bio and 
therefore must be Bojar’s interpretive assumption. 
